Are You Sure You're Sure? -- Effects of Visual Representation on the
  Cliff Effect in Statistical Inference by Helske, Jouni et al.
1Are You Sure You’re Sure? - Effects of Visual
Representation on the Cliff Effect in Statistical
Inference
Jouni Helske, Satu Helske, Matthew Cooper, Member, IEEE Computer
Society, Anders Ynnerman, Member, IEEE, and Lonni Besançon
Abstract—Common reporting styles of statistical results, such as confidence intervals (CI), are prone to dichotomous interpretations especially
on null hypothesis testing frameworks, for example by claiming significant differences between drug treatment and placebo groups due to the
non-overlapping CIs of the mean effects, while disregarding the magnitudes and absolute difference in the effect sizes. Techniques relying on the
visual estimation of the strength of evidence have been recommended to limit such dichotomous interpretations but their effectiveness has been
challenged. We ran two experiments to compare several representation alternatives of confidence intervals, and used Bayesian multilevel models
to estimate the effects of the representation styles on differences in subjective confidence of the results and preferences in visualization styles.
Our results suggest that adding visual information to classic CI representation can decrease the sudden drop around p-value 0.05 compared to
classic CIs and textual representation of CI with p-values. All data analysis and scripts are available https://github.com/helske/statvis.
Index Terms—Statistical inference, visualization; confidence intervals; hypothesis testing; Bayesian inference.
F
1 Introduction
One of the most common research questions in many scientific
fields is “Does X have an effect on Y?”, where, for example,
X is a new drug and Y is some disease. Often the question is
reduced to “Does the average effect of X differ from zero?”, or
“Does X significantly differ from Z?”. There are various statistical
approaches available for answering this question, and many ways
to report the findings from such analyses. In many fields, null
hypothesis significance testing (NHST) has long been the de-facto
standard approach. NHST is based on the idea of postulating a “no-
effect” null hypothesis which we aim to reject. We then calculate
an appropriate test statistic based on assumptions about our data
and model, followed by the corresponding p-value, defined as the
probability of observing a result at least as extreme as the one we
observed, under the assumption that the null hypothesis is true.
Small p-values indicate incompatibility of the data with the null
model, again assuming that the assumptions used in calculating the
p-value hold.
The ongoing “replication crisis” [1] especially in social and life
sciences has produced many critical comments against arbitrary
p-value thresholds and significance testing in general (e.g., [2],
[3], [4]), with some arguing for a complete ban of NHST and
p-values. Some journals have also advocated the ban of p-values.
For example, in 2015, the Journal of Basic and Applied Social
Psychology banned both p-values and confidence intervals [5], and
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more recently the Journal of Political Analysis [6] also banned the
use of p-values.
Despite the critique, significance testing in one form or another
is likely going to stay as a part of a scientist’s toolbox, and because
many of the problems with NHST are due to misunderstandings
among those who conduct statistical analysis as well as among
those who interpret results, there has also been work on making it
easier to avoid the common pitfalls of NHST either by altering the
way analyses are conducted or how the results are presented [7],
[8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13]. Instead of arguing for better method-
ological solutions (such as converting to Bayesian approaches [14]),
here we study whether different visualization styles of common
statistical problems could help to alleviate some of the problems
relating to significance testing and the so-called cliff effect where,
despite small numerical changes in the estimate and p-value, there
is a large shift in how the results are interpreted.
To study potential effects of various representation styles of
statistical results, we conducted two experiments on researchers
using statistical analysis in their work, and analysed the answers
from the experiments using Bayesian multilevel models which
allowed us to avoid many of the problems we aimed at studying.
Our results suggest that despite increased debate around NHST
and related concepts, these problems persist in the scientific
community, but visualization can help to reduce the tendency for
a cliff effect and dichotomous interpretations of statistical results.
Even though this paper is particularly aimed at the field of human
computer interaction and visualization research (HCI/VIS), the
results naturally apply to the whole scientific community using
hypothesis testing.
Our contributions in this paper are as follow. First, we present
the results of a study on the potential differences in interpreting
results of an artificial one-sample experiment where have a sample
of independent observations from some underlying population, and
we wish to infer whether the unknown population mean differs
from zero. The participants are then presented the results using
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2either textual information of p-values and confidence interval (CI),
only a graphical CI using traditional visualization style of vertical
line with whiskers, a gradient CI plot constructed by multiple
CIs with varying nominal coverages, or violin CI plot where
horizontal width of gradient CI plot is varied according to density
of the t-distribution used in constructing the CI. We also analyse
the data of an additional study on the potential differences in
interpreting results of an artificial two-sample experiment where
participants are presented with only a graphical CI, a gradient
CI plot, a violin CI plot, or discrete violin CI plot. In addition of
analyzing the quantitative results of our experiments, we also briefly
describe the qualitative feedback of participants regarding the
different visualization styles. We analyze the effects of visualization
styles for statistical inference using a Bayesian approach in a way
which avoids the many pitfalls persistent in the analysis relying
on statistical significance testing. Our study is fully reproducible
which hopefully helps and encourages the HCI and VIS community
to move beyond simple NHST approaches.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this paper our main interests are the visualizations of uncertainty,
the common misconceptions and errors made with frequentist
approaches of inferential statistics and their associated visualization
techniques. As our focus is on variations of confidence interval
visualizations, we will first shortly review the basic definition and
interpretation of the CI.
2.1 Confidence Interval for Sample Mean
Given a sample of values x1, . . . ,xn from a normal distribution with
unknown mean µ and variance σ2, the 95% confidence interval
for the mean is computed using a sample mean x¯, sample standard
deviation s, sample size n and t-distribution:
x¯± tα/2(n−1)
s√
n
, (1)
where tα/2(n− 1) is the critical value from t-distribution with
n−1 degrees of freedom and significance level α (typically 0.05).
The interpretation of the 95% CI is as follows: Given a multiple
95% CIs computed from independent samples of x1, . . . ,xn from
N(µ,σ2), on average 95% of these intervals will contain the true
expected value µ . It is important to note that this interpretation is
about the long-run performance of the procedure used to compute
CIs, not about a single realised CI. In other words, given a single
sample and corresponding CI, we cannot infer whether the true
population mean µ is contained within the CI or not. CI is based on
the frequentist probability interpretation of repeated experiments
where the end points of the CI are random variables, and in the
frequentist context one cannot assign probabilities to a single
realized event (CI) [15]. Another way of interpreting 95% CI is
that it represents values of µ for which the difference between µ
and x¯ is not statistically significant at the 5% level.
Above we considered a case where the variables x are normally
distributed. In cases where x is non-normal, theory will still
approximately hold for large samples due to the central limit
theorem. For small samples, the actual long-run coverage is
typically lower, depending on the amount of non-normality.
2.2 The Problem of Dichotomous Thinking
Let us suppose that we obtain through an experiment a p-value of
p = 0.043. Most researchers would consider this a strong enough
evidence against H0. What if we obtained, however, a p-value
of p = 0.06? While the difference is actually pretty small [16],
[17], most researchers would, following recommendations from
colleagues and textbooks, consider this as not enough evidence
against H0. This type of reasoning, often called dichotomous
thinking or dichomotous inference has been shown to be detrimental
to science [2], [18], [19]. While dichotomous thinking has been
heavily criticized by scholars (e.g., [7], [18], [19], [20], [21] it still
seems to be heavily persistent for example in the HCI community
[22].
But when is the p-value small enough? How does one interpret
a p-value? In 2016, the confusion, misuse, and critique around p-
values led the American Statistical Association to issue a statement
on p-values and statistical significance which “would shed light on
an aspect of our field that is too often misunderstood and misused in
the broader research community” [23] by, for example, reminding
us that a proper inference must be based on full and transparent
reporting and computing, a single number (p-value) is not equal to
scientific reasoning.
Many other authors have criticized the whole NHST approach,
due to an increased dichotomous thinking based on arbitrary
threshold values [2], [17], [18], [21], [24], [25], common mis-
interpretations of p-values (e.g. the fallacy of accepting the null
[26], reading p-values as the probability that the null hypothesis is
true), as well as the several questionable research practices (QRPs)
that often come with the use of NHST, such as p-hacking (testing
a number of hypotheses until a low p-value is found), HARKing
(presenting post-hoc hypothesis as a priori hypothesis), selective
outcome reporting, and the file-drawer effect (limiting publication
to statistically significant results only) [27], [28], [29], [30], [31],
[32]. Additionally, sometimes p-values are reported without effect
sizes, even though the p-value itself does not help readers determine
the practical importance of the presented results. It should be noted
that it is likely that many of these issues relating to the data-led
analysis (named by [33] as the “garden of forking paths”) are
typically not intentional, and they can occur in a broader scope
than just NHST.
Due to these issues, it is sometimes recommended to either
replace or complement p-values with confidence intervals (CI) or
modelling approaches [7], [21], [34], [35]. The argument is that CIs
could reduce dichotomous interpretations as they represent both the
effect size and the sampling variation around this value. However,
CIs are also prone to misinterpretation, as confidence intervals are
based on a frequentist notion of repeated experiments, and thus,
like in the case of p-values, the correct interpretation of a CI is not
very intuitive: if one repeats the same experiment independently
infinitely many times and computes the 95% CI in each case, 95%
of these intervals would contain the true parameter value. The
confidence level (95% in this case) is related to the algorithm used
to compute the CI, i.e., we have guarantees that CIs behave well on
average (assuming all other underlying assumptions are correct),
not that a specific CI captures the true parameter value. In terms of
frequentist probability the end points of the CI are random variables
before their realization while the true parameter value is fixed but
unknown. However, after calculating one particular CI there is no
randomness, so we cannot define the probability that a specific
CI contains the true parameter value. However, CIs can also lead
3to dichotomous thinking and reporting ( [22], [36], [37]); if zero
does not belong to the 95% CI, the difference of mean from zero is
statistically significant on 0.05 significance level.
2.3 The Cliff Effect
The cliff effect is a term coined by Rosenthal and Gaito to
describe a sudden drop of confidence that a real effect exists
just above p = 0.05 [38] that can be used as a proxy to measure
dichotomous inferences [36]. Rosenthal and Gaito’s initial study
[38] demonstrated the cliff effect on 19 researchers in psychology
(10 graduate students), and their findings were later replicated by
Nelson et al. [39] on a much larger sample (85 psychologists).
However, a more recent work by [40] states that claims on the
cliff effect might be overstated and that only a small ratio of their
participants would adopt an all-or-none strategy. Nonetheless, a
later study highlighted that even statisticians were not immune
to misinterpretations of p-values and could be impressed more
by statistically significant results [41]. However, due to the focus
on psychologists only in [36], [38], [39], [40], and as some of
the details of the experiments are not presented (such as the exact
question asked from the participants), it is difficult to assess whether
these finding hold in a more general population.
Previous studies on interpretations of p-values and confidence
intervals have suggested that there are two to four confidence
interpretation profiles [12], [36], [40]. For example, Lai [36]
categorized respondents’ confidence profiles into four different
categories, but discarded a large proportion respondents whose
answers did not fit clearly into these categories. While some
individual variation and hybrid interpretation styles likely exist,
due to historical reasons it is likely that the main profiles are
the all-or-none category (related to Neyman-Pearson significance
testing), and the gradually decreasing confidence category (related
to the Fisher’s significance testing approach). See e.g., [42] for
descriptions of the original approaches to significance testing by
Fisher, Neyman, and Pearson as well as their connection to the
current NHST practice.
Confidence intervals (CIs) have been suggested as a solution to
the cliff effect problem with p-values [7], [35], but studies by Lai
[36] and Hoekstra et al. [37] suggest that CIs are also vulnerable
to the cliff effect. Moreover, other studies have underlined the
potential misunderstandings around confidence intervals (e.g.,
[43]).
Another solution to the problems with confidence intervals and
p-values is to embrace the Bayesian paradigm, and use credible
intervals with more intuitive interpretations: given the model and
the prior distribution of the parameter, 95% credible interval
contains the unknown parameter value with 95% probability. Or
perhaps even better, one can present the whole posterior distribution
of the parameter of interest. While it is possible to argue that one
should always strive to perform Bayesian analysis (see e.g., [44],
[45]), p-values confidence interval are likely going to remain in
use in many scientific fields, despite their flaws. Therefore it is of
interest to study whether one could alleviate the problems relating
to the dichotomous and overall wrong interpretations of these tools
by changing their typical representation styles.
2.4 Visualization of Uncertainty and Statistical Results
Many researchers in the visualization community have focused
on providing efficient uncertainty visualization techniques (see
e.g., Hullman et al. [46]) and our work directly relates to this.
Indeed, visual representation of statistical results aim at showing
and helping readers and researchers understand the uncertainty
of their observations. Correll et al. [11] studied four different
visualization styles for mean and error in several settings. However,
participants were only given information about the sampling
distribution of the mean, but were then asked about the likelihood
of future observation (which relates to the sampling distribution
of the observations). Furthermore, error bars and other statistical
representations require the audience to have an understanding
of statistics which is likely to go beyond the knowledge of an
average Amazon’s Mechanical Turk participant used in their study
[47], [48]. Our goal, in contrast to Correll et al.’s [11], is to gain
knowledge of how well researchers dealing with statistical analysis
are affected by different representation styles of simple statistical
procedures.
Several visualization techniques have been derived to show the
uncertainty of the estimation in addition to the point estimate which
have several advantages over the communication of a sole point
estimate [49], [50]. Showing the theoretical or empirical probability
distribution of the variable of interest is a commonly used technique
to communicate about uncertainty. For example, probability density
plots are often used for describing the known distributions such
as Gaussian distribution or estimated density functions based on
samples of interest (e.g., observed data or samples from posterior
distribution in a Bayesian setting). Violin plots [51] are rotated and
mirrored kernel density plots, so that the uncertainty is encoded as
the width of the violin. Raindrop plots [52] are similar to the violin
plots, but are based on log-density. The gradient plot uses opacity
instead of shape to convey the uncertainty (see e.g., [11]), while
quantile dotplots [53], [54] are discrete analogs to the probability
density plot.
Various alternative representation styles specifically for CIs
are commonly used (see e.g., [55]. In order to remedy the
misunderstanding and misinterpretation of CIs, Kalinoski et al.
[12] designed Cat’s eye confidence interval which uses normal
distributions to depict the relative likelihood of values within
the CI, based on the “Fisherian style” interpretation of CI. Our
work closely resembles the one from Kalinoski et al. [12] as we
try to see whether different visuals can impact the perception
and understanding of the underlying statistical results. A violin
plot with additional posterior interval ranges are also used to
describe arbitrary shaped (univariate) posterior distributions based
on posterior samples, for example in the tidybayes R package
(coined as eye plot) [56]. Particularly related to our work is also
the work from Kale et al. [48] who studied Hypothetical Outcome
Plots. However, instead of focusing on static visualization like we
do, they focus on using animation to display the uncertainty of the
plotted data. Going even further, Dragicevic et al. [13] propose to
use interactive explorable statistical analyses in research documents
to increase their transparency.
3 ONE-SAMPLE EXPERIMENT
We are interested in the potential differences in interpreting results
of an artificial experiment when participants are presented with
textual information of the experiment in a form of a p-value and
a CI, only a graphical CI, a gradient CI plot, or a violin CI plot
(see Fig. 1 and the descriptions in subsection 3.1). The setting is
simple yet common: we have a sample of independent observations
from some underlying population, and we wish to infer whether the
unknown population mean differs from zero. The main question
4here is whether the representation style affects the interpretation of
the results, for example in terms of a cliff effect.
3.1 Conditions
3.1.1 Textual Information with p-value
Our first representation is text consisting of exact p-value of two-
sided t-test, sample mean estimate and lower and upper limits of
95% confidence interval (see Fig. 1). This style is concise, contains
information about the effect size and the corresponding variation
(width of the CI), while the p-value provides evidence in hypothesis
testing style.
While this format provides information about the effect size
and uncertainty together with the p-value, it can be argued that
due to the strong tradition in NHST the inclusion of a p-value
can cause dichotomous thinking even when an accompanying CI
information is provided. While the sample size is not stated in this
format, this information was provided separately in our experiment
for each condition (as part of the explanatory text for the task).
3.1.2 Classic Confidence Interval Visualization
Instead of relying only on textual information, confidence intervals
and sample means are commonly visualized as line segments
with end points typically containing horizontal lines (see Fig. 1).
Compared to textual information, visual representation is could be
better at conveying the uncertainty.
While the width of the horizontal lines of the CI do not have
semantic meaning, it is sometimes argued (although we have found
no studies to suggest this) that their width emphasises the limits
of CIs and increase dichotomous inferences, and intervals without
the horizontal lines should be preferred. We went with the more
traditional design as they are likely still commonly used and a
default option in many statistical software such as SPSS.
3.1.3 Gradient Color Plot for CI (Gradient CI Plot)
In order to reduce the dichotomous nature of classic CI visual-
ization, we test the effect of using multiple overlaid confidence
intervals with varying coverage levels and opacity. This type of
format is fairly common when presenting prediction intervals for
future observations [57]], but less so in case of CIs. While using
only a few overlaid CIs (e.g., 80%, 90% and 95%) is perhaps more
common practice, we decided to replicate the gradient plot format
used in previous approaches [11] which provides more emphasis
on the 95% interval and thus is more comparable with classic,
single CI approach. Our gradient CI plot contains a colored area of
95% CI complemented with gradually colored areas corresponding
to 95.1% to 99.9% CIs (with 0.1 percentage point increments),
overlaid with horizontal line corresponding to the sample mean
(Fig. 1). The coloring was from hex color #2ca25f to #e5f5f9
taken from ColorBrewer’s 3-class BuGn palette [58], corresponding
to approximately eucalyptus to light cyan.
Compared to classical CI visualization this format provides
additional information, but gradual colors can be difficult to
interpret accurately, and from technical point of view this format is
also harder to create than classic CIs.
3.1.4 CI as t-violin Plot (Violin CI Plot)
While gradient CI plot gives information about the uncertainty
beyond 95% CI, the use of rectangular regions with constant width
can be misleading. Therefore, in our fourth format the horizontal
width of the CIs corresponds to the t-distribution which is also used
in constructing the CIs. Essentially the shape corresponds to the
case where one would compute sequence of confidence intervals
with very fine increments the width of each CI are computed using
the underlying t-distribution, so that the width of the violin at point
y is
p(
√
n(y− x¯)
s
)
√
n
s
, (2)
where p is the probability density function of t-distribution with
n− 1 degrees of freedom and x¯ is the sample mean and s is the
standard deviation (Fig. 1).
Compared to other formats studied, violin CI plots are more
challenging to create, and the probability density function style can
lead to erroneous probability interpretations for which CIs cannot
provide answers. On the other hand the additional visual clues due
to the shape can help overcome the difficulty to interpret gradient
colors.
3.2 Participants and Apparatus
The experiment was run as an online survey. Its preregistration
is available at OSF1. As the preregistration states, the number
of participants was not decided in advance, but the experiment’s
ending date was fixed to the 11th of March 2019 which corresponds
to the survey being available for 21 days. As stated in subsection 2.4,
our goal, contrary to past work, was to understand how researchers
interpret their statistical results and we therefore aimed at recruiting
academics. To recruit participants, we initially contacted potential
participants via email in several fields (namely Human Computer
Interaction, Visualization, Statistics, Psychology, and Analytical
Sociology), and then survey was shared openly on Twitter, and
suitable interest groups on Reddit, LinkedIn, and Facebook. The
codes for the experiment are available online at Github.
There are multiple potential factors which could (while not
necessarily should) have an effect in interpreting results of this
simple experiment: p-value, total length of the confidence interval,
effect size, sample size, and representation style. Since our focus
was on the representation styles, and because we wanted to keep
the survey short in order to increase the number of responses, we
used a fixed set of p-values (0.001, 0.01, 0.04, 0.05, 0.06, 0.1,
0.5, 0.8), and a fixed standard deviation of 3. By defining also
the sample size, the sample mean was then fully determined by
these values. We used two sets of questions, one with a sample
size of n = 50 and another with n = 200. Each participant saw
results corresponding to only one of these sets. Fig. 2 shows the
configurations as 95% CIs with dots representing the means.
During the experiment we displayed each trial one at a
time for each participant, and asked the following question: “A
random sample of 200 adults from Sweden were prescribed a
new medication for one week. Based on the information on
the screen, how confident are you that the medication has a
positive effect on body weight (increase in body weight)?”. They
answered on a continuous scale (100 points between 0 and 1, the
numerical value was not shown) using a slider, with labelled ends
(“Zero confidence”, “Full confidence”), which was explained to the
participants as “Leftmost position of the slider corresponds to the
case “I have zero confidence in claiming a positive effect”, whereas
the rightmost position of the slider corresponds to the case “I am
fully confident that there is a positive effect”. The slider’s thumb
was hidden first in order to avoid the possible bias due its initial
1. https://osf.io/v75ea/?view_only=e481a9ad345e4e689799d65d988c1c5f
5Mean weight increase 0.109kg, 
 95% CI: [−0.069kg, 0.287kg],
p = 0.228 (2−sided t−test)
CI level
99.9%
95%
90%
85%
80%
Fig. 1. Representation styles used in the experiments: Textual version with p-value, classic 95% confidence interval (CI), gradient CI plot, violin CI plot, and
discrete violin CI plot.
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Fig. 2. Configuration used in the one-sample experiment. See text for details.
position. It became visible when the participant clicked the slider.
Finally, while the slider was hidden, participants couldn’t proceed
to the next question.
Our small pilot study suggested that it was hard to understand
the meaning of the violin CI plot due to its non-standard meaning
(participants were prone to misread the figure as typical violin
plot of empirical density of the data). Therefore in order to
explain the interpretation of the violin plot in this context, we
had to also explain the basics of CI computations, and to keep
all representations on same level, we added explanatory texts
to all conditions. This likely affected the answers of some
participants, and it could be argued that the true variation between
the participants’ answers and the size of the cliff effect could have
been greater without these explanations.
In order to balance the learning effects, the order of the four
conditions (representation style) was counterbalanced using Latin
squares, and within each condition the ordering of trials was
randomly permuted for each participants. At the end of the survey,
participants had to give feedback on the representation formats
and rank them from 1 (best) to 4 (worst). We gave participants
the possibility to rank with ties. They could also leave additional
comments about the survey in general.
We gathered answers from 114 participants, from which one
participant was excluded as the answers to the initial questionnaire
were nonsensical. We categorised the expertise of the participants
into three groups, “Statistics/ML” (20 participants), “VIS/HCI”
(32), and “Other” (61).
3.3 Statistical methods
All analysis was done in the R environment [59] using the brms
package [60]. The visualizations of the results were created with
the ggplot2 package [61]. The collected data, scripts used for
data analysis, and additional figures are available on Github. We
also created an accompanying R package ggstudent for drawing
modified violin and gradient CI plots used in the study. The
ggstudent package is also available on Github.
To analyse the results we built a Bayesian multilevel model with
participants’ answers as the response variable, and the underlying
p-value and visualization as an explanatory variable. While we
often perceive the probabilities and strength of evidence as having
a linear relationship after logit-transformations of both variables
[62], in case of significance testing with potential for dichotomous
thinking this relationship is likely not true due to the cliff effect and
the excess mapping of low and high p-values to perceived complete
lack of evidence or full confidence. Therefore a simple linear model
with logit-transformations of p-values and the confidence scores
was not suitable here.
A typical choice for modelling proportions with disproportion-
ately large amounts of zeros and ones (i.e., zero or full confidence)
is zero-one-inflated beta regression. However, as we wanted to
incorporate the prior knowledge of the potential linear relationship
of confidence and probabilities in logit-logit-scale, instead of the
zero-one-inflated beta distribution we created a zero-one-inflated
logit-normal model with the probability density function (pdf)
defined piece-wise as
p(x) =

α(1− γ), if x = 0,
αγ, if x = 1,
(1−α)φ(logit(x),µ,σ), otherwise.
(3)
Here α = P(x ∈ {0,1}) is the probability of answering one of the
extreme values (not at all confident or fully confident), whereas
γ = P(x = 1 | x ∈ {0,1}), is the conditional probability of full
confidence given that the answer is one of the extremes 2. Thus
these two parameters model the extreme probability of answers,
and when the answer is between the extremes, we model it with the
logit-normal distribution (φ(x) is the pdf of the normal distribution
parameterized with mean µ and standard deviation σ ). Explanatory
variables can be added to the model to predict α , γ , µ , and σ ,
using a log-link for σ , logit-link for α and γ , and identity-link
for µ . Compared to a frequentist approach, our Bayesian model
allows us to make flexible probabilistic statements based on the
posterior distribution of this model (e.g., probability that the average
2. Note that while generating data from this distribution is straightforward,
the expected value of this distribution is intractable as the moments of the logit-
normal distribution do not have analytical solutions. However, these moments
can be easily computed via Monte Carlo simulation.
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Descriptive statistics of the difference in confidence when p = 0.04 and
p = 0.06
Mean SD SE 2.5% 97.5%
p-value 0.19 0.27 0.03 -0.19 0.72
CI 0.23 0.25 0.02 -0.05 0.84
Gradient CI 0.10 0.24 0.02 -0.37 0.74
Violin CI 0.13 0.20 0.02 -0.16 0.62
perceived confidence is twice as high when p-value is 0.04 versus
0.06). For further information about Bayesian modelling in general
see, e.g., [63].
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Confidence profiles
As a first step, we checked some descriptive statistics of the
potential cliff effect, defined as
E [confidence(p = 0.04)− confidence(p = 0.06)] ,
the average difference in confidence between cases p = 0.04
and p = 0.06. Table 1 shows how gradient and violin CIs
have somewhat smaller drop in confidence when moving from
p = 0.04 to p = 0.06 compared to the p-value and the classic CI
visualization.
To further analyse the data, we used a Bayesian multilevel
model as described in subsection 3.3. Due to the experiment’s
setup, participants’ answers were influenced by the information
on the screen, which in turn depended on the underlying p-value,
visualization style, and sample size. However, descriptive analysis
of the data suggested that the sample size did not have a clear
effect on the answers (as it shouldn’t have) so we dropped that
variable from further analysis. On the other hand, field of expertise
showed some potential differences in interpretations, so we took
it into consideration. Also due to the potential cliff effect, we
wanted to allow different slopes of the confidence curve for cases
when p < 0.05 and p > 0.05. With regards to the case of p = 0.05,
we allowed extra drop in confidence via an indicator variable
I(p = 0.05), as it was not clear whether this boundary case should
be on the "significant" or "not significant" side. Regarding the
probability of an extreme answer, the relationship with respect to
the p-value was assumed to be non-linear so we treated p-values
as a categorical variable. For the conditional probability of full
confidence γ we used the p-value as a categorical variable with a
monotonic effect (using the simplex parameterization suggested in
[64]), but grouped p > 0.05 values together.
In order to account the individual variation in answers, we
tested several random effect configurations (available at Github) for
the µ and α using posterior predictive checks and 10-fold cross-
validation [65]. The final model structure, defined as the extended
Wilkinson-Rogers syntax [66], [67] was chosen as follows:
µ ∼ viz · I(p < 0.05) · logit(p)+ viz · I(p = 0.05)
+(viz+ I(p < 0.05)+ logit(p) | id),
α ∼ p · viz+(1 | id),
γ ∼ mo(p),
(4)
where p is a categorical variable defining the true p-value, logit(p)
is a continuous variable of the logit-transformed p-value, mo(p)
denotes a monotonic effect of the p-value, the dot corresponds to
the interaction (i.e., I(p = 0.05) · viz denotes both the main and
TABLE 2
Posterior mean, standard deviation and limits of 95% posterior intervals of
E[confidence(p = 0.04)− confidence(p = 0.06)] for different visualization
styles.
Mean SD 2.5% 97.5%
p-value 0.26 0.03 0.21 0.31
CI 0.31 0.03 0.25 0.36
Gradient CI 0.14 0.03 0.09 0.20
Violin CI 0.16 0.03 0.11 0.21
two-way interaction terms) and (· | id) denotes participant-level
random effects. As priors we used the relatively uninformative
defaults of the brms R package: t(3,1,10) for the intercept term of
the µ and Logistic(0,1) for the intercepts of α and γ , half-t(3,0,10)
for all the standard deviation parameters, N(0,1) for the random
effects, LKJ(1) prior [68] for the correlation matrices of random
effects, and symmetric Dirichlet(1) prior for the coefficients of the
monotonic effect.
Fig. 3 shows the posterior mean curves based on the population
level effects (vertical lines correspond to 95% posterior intervals).
As can be seen from the figure, the magnitude of the slope of
the confidence level with relation to the underlying p-value is the
smallest with the traditional CI within the “statistically significant
region,” i.e., p < 0.05, but there is a large drop when moving to
p > 0.05, even larger than with the textual information of the p-
value. The textual p-value, on the other hand, behaves similarly to
the violin CI plot until p= 0.05, when the confidence in the p-value
representation drops below all other techniques. The gradient CI
plot and violin CI plot behave similarly, except that the confidence
level of the gradient CI plot is constantly below the violin CI
plot. There were no clear differences in the probability of an
extreme answer (“zero confidence” or “full confidence”) between
visualization styles (not shown here, but figure is available on
Github).
Finally, Table 2 shows the posterior summary statistics of the
cliff effect E[confidence(p= 0.04)−confidence(p= 0.06)], which
emphasise how the cliff effect is similar with p-value and classic
CI, and with gradient and violin CI visualizations, with the latter
pairing having a considerable smaller drop in confidence around
p = 0.05.
3.4.2 Subjective Rankings
For analysing the subjective rankings of the representation styles,
we estimated a Bayesian ordinal regression model with brms where,
based on the model selection by leave-one-out cross-validation
[69], we explained the rank with visualization style and individual
variance. Fig. 4 shows the results from this model as a probability
of obtaining a certain rank. From this figure, it is easily seen that
the textual p-value typically obtains the worst rank, while violin
CI and classic CI are the most preferred options, and gradient CI
seems to divide opinions most.
3.4.3 Qualitative Feedback
At the end of the experiment, participants were invited to weigh
in on the limitations and benefits of each technique. The fully
categorized and raw data is available on Github, but we summarize
the main points of interest here. Concerning p-values, participants
reported them to be easy to read and accurate (× 40 participants).
However, participants also stated that they could hinder the
readability of a paper if many of them had to be reported (× 11),
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Fig. 3. Posterior means of confidence and corresponding 95% posterior
intervals for different visualization styles in the first experiment, on the logit-
scale, with a zoom-in plot of the cases with 0.04 ≤ p ≤ 0.06. A non-linear
relationship between the true p-value and reported confidence indicates a
cliff effect.
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Fig. 4. Subjective ranking probabilities and the corresponding 95% posterior
intervals for visualization styles of the first one-sample experiment. A higher
value for rank 1 indicates preference for the method while a higher value for
rank 4 indicates distaste.
that they could be difficult to interpret (× 33), that some expertise
was needed to understand them (× 10), and that text-only might
make readers focus on p-values exclusively (× 7). Furthermore,
some participants explained that a visualization would have made
the analysis much easier, in particular for the confidence interval
(× 22). The condition with classical confidence intervals was said
to be a standard (× 19) that allows quick analysis with clear figures
(× 42) and that scales very well to multiple comparison (× 11).
However, participants also reported that this visual representation
was missing information—likelihood of the tails for instance—and
that it should be augmented with more statistical information (×
33). Additionally, they were said to possibly foster dichotomization
(× 10). Violin CI plots were judged to be visually pleasing
(× 8), to provide all the statistical information that classical
confidence intervals fail to provide (× 31) and to help avoiding the
dichotomization pitfall (× 5). Nonetheless, some participants stated
that they were representing too much information (× 4), that they
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Fig. 5. Configuration used in the second experiment. See the text for details.
might require training as they are not often used (× 17), and that the
gradient at the tails was hard to see (× 13). In addition to this, some
participants explained that such plots could be misunderstood due
to their similarity with the violin plot (× 6). Finally, the gradient CI
plots were reported to be visually pleasing (× 5), to provide more
information than a classical confidence interval (× 20), to help
avoiding dichotomization (× 6). In addition to this, participants
stated (either as a positive or negative point) that the cut off after
95% was difficult to assess visually (× 9) which could also help
reduce dichotomized interpretations. Participants also explained
that the gradient could be hard to distinguish (× 9), that making
inferences based on gradient plots could be more difficult (× 11)
and that the width was unnecessary visual information because it
does not encode anything (× 13).
4 TWO-SAMPLE EXPERIMENT
After conducting the first experiment, we deployed a second survey
with a similar framing, but this time instead of comparing the base
value of zero, the task was to compare two means from “treatment”
and “control” groups. Similar to our first controlled experiment,
this study was also preregistered3), and is available at Github in
the same repository as the first one. Fig. 5 shows the configuration
used in this second experiment.
4.1 Conditions, Participants and Apparatus
The conditions and the overall design of the study were same
as in the one-sample experiment, except from the fact that we
removed the textual p-value representation and replaced it with a
more discrete version of the violin plot (see the rightmost figure
in Fig. 1). The exact question was framed as “A random sample
of 50 adults from Sweden were prescribed a new medication for
one week. Another random sample of 50 adults from Sweden
were assigned to a control group and given a placebo. Based on
the information on the screen, how confident are you that the
medication decreases the body weight? Note the y-axis, higher
values correspond to larger weight loss.”, and the slider endpoints
were defined as “I have zero confidence in claiming an effect”, and
“I am fully confident that there is an effect.”.
For this second experiment we used the same channels for
sharing the link as in the first study and obtained 39 answers. We
categorised the expertise of 4 participants as “Stats/ML”, 8 as
“VIS/HCI” and the rest as “Other”.
3. https://osf.io/brjzx/?view_only=e481a9ad345e4e689799d65d988c1c5f
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Descriptive statistics of the difference in confidence when p = 0.04 and
p = 0.06 for the second experiment with two samples.
Mean SD SE 2.5% 97.5%
CI 0.09 0.12 0.02 -0.22 0.28
Gradient CI 0.02 0.13 0.02 -0.20 0.28
Continuous violin CI -0.01 0.08 0.01 -0.15 0.17
Discrete violin 0.05 0.18 0.03 -0.19 0.49
TABLE 4
Posterior mean, standard deviation and limits of 95% posterior intervals of
E[confidence(p = 0.04)− confidence(p = 0.06)] for different visualization
styles of the second experiment.
Mean SD 2.5% 97.5%
CI 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.15
Gradient 0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.09
Continuous Violin -0.04 0.03 -0.10 0.03
Discrete Violin 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.14
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Confidence profiles
Table 3 shows observed differences between subjective confidence
when the underlying p-value was 0.06 versus 0.04. The cliff effect
is again the largest with the classic CI. The relatively large standard
error in the case of the discrete violin CI is explained by a few
cases where the respondents have reported a very large drop in
confidence regarding the discrete violin CI. Overall the cliff effect
seems to be much smaller than in the one-sample case (where the
average drop was around 0.1–0.25 depending on the technique).
For analysing the results, we used similar multilevel model as
for the first experiment, this time with following structure (again
chosen based on cross-validation):
µ ∼ viz · I(p < 0.05) · logit(p)+ viz · I(p = 0.05)
+(I(p < 0.05)+ viz+ logit(p) | id),
α ∼ viz · p+(1 | id),
γ ∼ mo(p),
(5)
Fig. 6 and Table 4 show the posterior mean curves of
confidence and summary statistics of E[confidence(p = 0.04)−
confidence(p = 0.06)] respectively. There is a peculiar rise in the
confidence level for the continuous violin CI when the underlying
p-value is 0.05, but overall, compared to one-sample experiment,
here we do not see clear differences in cliff effect. As in the first
experiment, we saw no clear differences in the probability of an
extreme answer between visualization styles (figure available on
Github). In fact, we observe no clear signs of these phenomena in
the two-sample experiment.
4.2.2 Subjective Rankings
As in the first experiment, we analysed the subjective rankings
of the representation styles by Bayesian ordinal regression model
where we explained the rank with visualization style and individual
variance. Fig. 7 presents the ranking probabilities which indicate
preferences towards the discrete violin plot (estimated to be
the most preferred style by 42% of the respondents). No clear
differences emerge between other styles, especially the classic CI
and the gradient CI behave very similarly.
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intervals for different visualization styles in the second experiment, on logit-
scale, with a zoom-in plot of the cases with 0.04 ≤ p ≤ 0.06. Non-linear
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effect.
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Fig. 7. Subjective ranking probabilities and the corresponding 95% posterior
intervals for visualization styles of the second experiment. Classic CI is likely
ranked as worst, whereas discrete violin CI is most often ranked as best.
4.2.3 Qualitative Feedback
For this second controlled experiment, participants were also asked
to weigh in on the limitations and benefits of each visualization.
The fully categorized and raw data is again available online and
we present the most recurrent comments here. Classical confidence
intervals were reported as easy to read and analyse (× 12), space-
efficient and a scalable visual representation (× 5), and as a
standard visualization technique (× 5). Yet, some participants
stated that they might call for dichotomous interpretations (× 5)
and that they lack some information (× 12). Continuous violin plots
were said to provide more information than a classical confidence
interval (× 2), but participants complained about the lack of explicit
markers for the confidence interval (× 6) and the gradient that
could be hard to see (× 3). Concerning discrete violin CI plots,
participants noted that they are visual pleasing (× 2), that they
provide more information than classical confidence intervals (×
10) and that seeing the discrete steps was was very helpful—
in comparison to the continuous violin plot (× 7). Still some
9participants highlighted that the gradient was hard to see (× 3), and
that these plots could provide too much information on a single
figure (× 2). Finally, gradient plots were deemed easy to interpret
(× 8) but participants highlighted that the width was unnecessary
(× 3), that some information was missing compared to gradient
plots (× 4) and that the gradient could be difficult to see (× 8).
5 DISCUSSION
Our results suggest that traditional CI visualization does not provide
clear benefits over numerical and textual information in terms
of reducing the cliff effect, although participants still preferred
the graphical presentation over text. More complex visualization
styles affected the cliff effect in first one-sample experiment, and
especially the violin plot style was also well received by the
participants. While we expected that these more novel visualization
styles (violin and gradient plots) would introduce additional
problems with the interpretation due to unfamiliarity, these potential
negative effects seemed to be smaller than the benefits. Some of
the problems with the violin CI plots could be partly explained by
the confusion with the typical uses of a violin plot (as suggested
by our qualitative feedback), namely as a visualization method of
the actual data. This highlights the importance of properly labeling
figures in research papers to avoid such misunderstandings. The
results from the second two-sample experiment suggest that the
cliff effect might be a more common problem when comparing
estimate to a constant versus comparing estimates to each other,
but further studies are needed in order to experiment if this is a
general rule or for example an artefact of our experimental setting.
Based on the social media behaviour, survey feedback, and
post-experiment discussions with some of the participants, our
convenience sample likely contains disproportionate amounts of
researchers with high knowledge and strong opinions on the topic
of dichotomous thinking and the replication crisis. In particular, the
links to the experiments were shared on the “Transparent Statistics”
Slack channel which gather HCI and VIS researchers who have
argued for non-dichotomous interpretations of statistical results in
their own work. We thus expect that our results likely downplay
the average cliff effect and related concepts compared to the much
broader and heterogeneous scientific community. While our focus
was on the CI-style visualisation of the sample mean, we believe
our results can be generalised into the broader context of visualizing
statistical results.
Overall our results are in line with the earlier literature which
suggest that the visual representations of the uncertainty can
alleviate the tendencies for cliff effect and dichotomous thinking
[36], [37]: we found that the classic visual representation of the
confidence intervals did not provide clear benefits over the p-value
combined with textual representation of the CI. However, our
results suggests that adding visual cues in terms of multiple CIs
(using gradient coloring and/or density shapes) can help reducing
the cliff effect.
In contrast to most of the earlier studies on the cliff effect which
have focused on psychologists, we placed a focus on visualization
and HCI researchers but also sent the survey to researchers of other
disciplines such as sociologists and statisticians. We also provide a
reproducible experiment with results available online and properly
describe the questions we asked from the participants.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We provided analysis on the experiments on the cliff effect to study
the effects of visual representation in interpreting statistical results.
We found evidence that the problems with dichotomous thinking
and cliff effect are still common problems among researchers
despite the amount of research and communications on this issue.
In addition to educating researchers about this issue, we found
that visualization can play an important role in reducing these
phenomena.
Our Bayesian multilevel model provides an illustration of how
the data from relatively simple experiments can be analysed in a
coherent modelling framework which can give us more complex
insights than simple descriptive statistics, avoids relying on the
significance testing framework, and provides easily interpretable
results due to the use of Bayesian approach where everything is
stated in terms of conditional probabilities representing the state
of knowledge. We hope this study encourages more model-based
analysis in the CHI and VIS community in the future.
The consideration for space-efficient visual representations
highlighted by some of our participants provides interesting avenues
for future research. In line with recent work on interactive analyses
and statistical visualization [13], [48], [70], [71], we also believe
that novel statistical representations free of the limitations of
traditional printing constraints could have a positive impact on both
in general scientific communication and reducing dichotomous
thinking. Indeed, our violin CIs could be made more space-efficient
in order to better scale to multiple comparison, for example by
using interactive scaling. We therefore plan to study such solutions
and their impact on statistical interpretations in future work. As
suggested by the discrepancy between the results of the first and
second experiments, another avenue for further research is to study
whether the cliff effect is stronger or more commonly occurring
in settings where comparisons are made with respect to a constant
reference point compared to multiple random variables.
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